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ResetDoC - Dialogues on Civilizations
Excellencies, Honored Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Let me express my deep gratitude to the organizers of
this International Symposium for inviting me to participate
in its proceedings. My gratitude extends first of all
to the representatives of the Egyptian government and
the Egyptian ministry of culture. I am equally grateful
to the directors of the Italian journal “RESET,”
especially Giancarlo Bosetti and Nina zu Fürstenberg,
for having conceived the idea of, and made plans for,
this symposium in Cairo.
We live in a time of looming culture clashes or “clashes
of civilizations” (to use Samuel Huntington’s
phrase); and of course, we live in a time of “terror
wars” involving the continuous alternation of
terror and counter-terror. This means: we live in a
time of power politics, now on a global scale. Power
seems to be the only “currency” recognized
in the world. Politics tends to be identified with power
politics. Needless to say: this is a recipe for culture
clashes and terror wars. But is “politics”
really the same as power politics? Is there not something
else in politics? Does not tradition teach us about
a different politics? Aristotle defined politics as
the striving for justice and the “good life.”
And Alfarabi wrote about a “virtuous city.”
And how do we find justice and the virtuous city? Not
by power, but by wisdom and learning—and learning
depends on listening and dialogue.
My intent today is twofold. First I want to discuss
with you the idea of intercultural dialogue, and I shall
do so by pointing out different forms of dialogical
interactions. Next, I want to examine some implications
of dialogue as a remedy against culture clashes. To
be sure, not all relations between societies and cultures
are dialogical or communicative. At a minimum, dialogue
implies some kind of mutuality or mutual exchange of
views. Probably one can arrange intercultural relations
along a broad spectrum ranging from complete monologue
to genuine dialogue, from radical unilateralism to full-fledged
multilateralism (and perhaps cosmopolitanism). In one
of my writings, titled Beyond Orientalism: Essays on
Cross-Cultural Encounter I have discussed this spectrum,
paying particular attention to the monological side
of this scale. On the monological or unilateral side,
one can find such prominent examples of non-mutuality
as military conquest, forced conversion, and ideological
indoctrination. I shall not dwell here on these unilateral
modes of intercultural relations.
Rather, I want to concentrate my attention on the dialogical
side of interactions. On this side of the spectrum one
can distinguish between three, or maybe three-and-a-half,
different possibilities. I shall take my bearings initially
from an essay by the German social theorist Jürgen
Habermas titled “On the Pragmatic, the Ethical,
and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason”
(which serves as the opening chapter in his book Justification
and Application). In his essay, Habermas differentiates
between three distinct uses or employments of “practical
reason,” that is, a reason geared toward practical
interaction: the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral
uses. The first type derives from utilitarianism and
finds expression in the confrontation between, and possible
accumulation of, individual interests. The second (“ethical”)
type draws its inspiration from Aristotelian ethics
as filtered through Hegel's dialectical philosophy.
Those thinkers, Habermas notes, who emphasis the “ethical”
use appropriate “the Hegelian legacy in the form
of an Aristotelian ethics of the good,” while
abandoning “the universalism of rational natural
law.” The third (“moral”) type, finally,
operates “in a Kantian spirit” and accentuates
“the unavoidable presuppositions” of argumentation
and the “impartiality” required of anyone
judging from “a moral point of view.” For
Habermas, adopting a rationalist stance, the third type
is “grounded in the communicative structure of
rational discourse as such.” His own moral theory,
called “discourse ethics,” in his view “forces
itself intuitively on anyone who is at all open to this
reflective from of communicative action.” In this
manner, discourse ethics “situates itself squarely
in the Kantian tradition.”
So far my summary of the Habermasian account. In what
follows I shall partially appropriate, but also significantly
modify his tripartite scheme for my own purposes: namely,
the task of exploring different forms or modalities
of intercultural dialogue. My main departure from Habermas
has to do with his portrayal of the “ethical”
use of reason. As it seems to me, his portrayal involves
a radical misreading of both Aristotle and Hegel (and
one might include Alfarabi). Most importantly, ethics
in the Aristotelian and Hegelian sense is reduced by
Habermas to a purely descriptive-empirical set of prevailing
customs or situated practices—a reading which
completely bypasses or ignores the inherent “ought”-quality
of Aristotle’s notion of virtue and of the Hegelian
striving for Sittlichkeit. There are some other problems
in this reading which I leave aside.
Adapting, but also modifying the Habermasian scheme
I distinguish between three, or perhaps three-and-a-half,
main types of intercultural dialogue. I list first the
different modalities and then comment briefly on each
of them. The three basic forms are these: (1) pragmatic-strategic
communication; (2) moral-universal discourse; and (3)
ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. To these one can add
a fourth type—but I prefer to treat it as a sub-category
under (3): agonal dialogue or contestation.
In pragmatic-strategic communication each partner seeks
to advance his or her own interests in negotiation with
the interests of other parties. To the extent one can
describe such communication as “dialogue,”
the latter takes the form mainly of mutual bargaining,
sometimes involving manipulation and even deception.
This kind of communicative exchange is well known in
international or inter-societal relations and constitutes
the central focus of the so-called “realist”
and “neo-realist” schools of international
politics. Prominent examples of such communication would
be trade or commercial negotiations; negotiations about
global warming and ecological standards; disarmament
negotiations; settlements of border disputes; peace
negotiations, and the like. Much of traditional diplomacy
is in fact carried on in this vein.
In moral-universal discourse partners seek consensus
on basic rules or norms of behavior binding on all partners,
potentially on a global level. Here the legacies of
modern natural law and of Kantian moral philosophy retain
their importance. Basic rules of (potentially) universal
significance are the rules of modern international law;
the international norms regarding warfare, war crimes
and crimes against humanity; the Geneva Conventions;
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and others.
One does not need to be a Kantian in a strict sense
in order to recognize the importance and even “categorically”
binding character of these norms (which have been accepted
by the great majority of governments and endorsed by
the vast majority of humankind). Surely, ours is not
the time to disparage or tamper with the mandatory quality
of international norms. Thus, the rules of the Geneva
Conventions are mandatory, no matter what terminology
individual governments choose to adopt. Likewise, launching
an unprovoked war is a crime against humanity; so is
the wanton killing of civilian populations. Here the
collective conscience of humanity has reached a certain
level below which we do not dare do regress.
In ethical-hermeneutical dialogue partners seek to understand
and appreciate each other’s life stories and cultural
backgrounds, including cultural and religious (or spiritual)
traditions, storehouses of literary and artistic expressions,
and existential agonies and aspirations. It is in this
mode that cross-cultural learning most importantly takes
place. It is also on this level that one encounters
the salience of Aristotle’s and Alfarabi’s
teaching about virtues and of the Hegelian practice
of Sittlichkeit. Ethics here is oriented toward the
“good life”—not in the sense of an
abstract “ought” but as the pursuit of an
aspiration implicit in all life-forms, though able to
take very different expressions in different cultures.
Since ethics on this level speaks to deeper human motivations,
this is really the dimension which is most likely to
mold human conduct in the direction of mutual ethical
recognition and peace. Hence, there is an urgent need
in our time to emphasize and cultivate this kind of
ethical pedagogy. On a limited scale, cross-cultural
dialogue in this sense already is practiced today: examples
would be inter-faith dialogues, the Parliament of the
World’s Religions, the World Public Forum, the
World Social Forum, various centers for the “dialogue
among civilizations,” exchange programs of scholars
and students, and the like.
To the three main types mentioned so far one may wish
to add as a fourth category that of agonal dialogue
or contestation. I prefer to treat it as a sub-category
of ethical dialogue, and I shall indicate my reason
for doing so. In the agonal situation, partners seek
not only to understand and appreciate each other’s
life forms, but also to convey to each other experiences
of exploitation and persecution, that is, grievances
having to do with past or persisting injustices and
sufferings. In addition to better understanding, agonal
dialogue adds the dimension of possible retribution
and rectification of grievances. Yet, retribution does
not necessarily involve the desire to “get even,”
to take revenge, and possibly to return injustice for
injustice by turning the previous victimizers into victims.
This is why prefer to list the agonal case as a sub-category
within ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. Placed in this
context, confrontation and contestation are not ends
in themselves but are put in the service of ethical
reconciliation and healing. There are prominent examples
of such an agonal hermeneutics in our time. I am referring
to the great commissions of inquiry established in various
parts of the world at the end of ethnic conflicts and/or
dictatorships: the so-called “Truth and Justice”
or “Truth and Reconciliation” Commissions.
The point of these commissions was both to establish
a record of past criminal actions and injustices and
to promote a process of social healing which would prevent
the recurrence of victimization. In light of the horrendous
forms of oppression and injustice prevailing in the
world today, one can only hope that humankind some day
will have the wisdom and courage to establish a global
Truth and Reconciliation Commission charged both with
exposing and rectifying existing abuses and with laying
the groundwork for a more just and livable global future.
Here are some words of Bishop Desmond Tutu who served
as President of the “Truth and Reconciliation
Commission” in South Africa (you can find the
passage in his book God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope
for Our Time):
I saw the power of the gospel when I was serving as
chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in South Africa. . . . The Commission gave perpetrators
of political crimes the opportunity to appeal for amnesty
by telling the truth of their actions and an opportunity
to ask for forgiveness. . . . As we listened to accounts
of truly monstruous deeds of torture and cruelty, it
would have been easy to dismiss the perpetrators as
monsters because their deeds were truly monstruous.
But we are reminded that God’s love is not cut
off from anyone.
Bishop Tutu speaks here as a Christian minister. But
the statement could also have been written by a Muslim—any
Muslim who remembers the opening lines in every chapter
of the Qur’an: “In the name of Allah, the
all-compassionate and all-merciful.”
Let me conclude with some words on intercultural dialogue
as an antidote to culture clashes and terror wars. As
it seems to me: we have today a huge surplus of “war
talk” and “mission talk” in the world,
and a huge deficit of civilization and of intercultural
or “civilizational dialogue.”
In early August of 2004 the writer Salman Rushdie spoke
to an international PEN conference in New York City.
I am not going to defend everything Rushdie has ever
done; but what he said at the PEN meeting was right
on target.
I want to start by saying that I don’t think any
of us who are at this event delude ourselves about terrorism.
Terrorism does exist. In this city of all cities, we
know that. We know when it exists, what it has done,
what it tries to do. We know it exists and must be fought.
I don’t think any of us would question that (But)
How we fight it in my view is going to be the great
civilizational test of our time. Will we become our
enemy or not? … Will we become intolerant as our
enemy is intolerant? Or will we not? Will we fight with
different weapons, weapons of openness and acceptance,
and seeking to increase the dialogue between peoples
rather than decrease it. This is a big test . . . It
seems to us, to PEN, to many of us in the last month
that we are not passing this text very well.
This is also for me the big test today. As I see it,
the big issue is whether we can develop a counterweight
to the dominant culture of violence, of terrorism and
counter-terrorism. Can we develop a politics aiming
at the welfare, the well-being or “eudaimonia”
of peoples in this world, instead of a mere politics
of domination and warfare? Can we develop a politics
promoting the good in people everywhere, rather than
merely controlling or eradicating perceived ills? Can
we have a global civilization, rather than global civil
war? A global virtuous city” in Alfarabi’s
sense, rather than a global politics dominated by war
lords equipped with weapons capable of annilating the
world many times over?
Thank you for your attention.
Beyond
Orientalism and Occidentalism
March 4th/6th 2006 - Cairo, Egypt
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