1. The European Union now faces
perhaps the greatest challenge in its history. It
is expanding – dramatically so – with
more than 70 million people becoming eligible for
new European passports this year. Simultaneously with
this expansion, the Union is attempting to transform
itself into a new type of political entity, as it
radically redefines itself through the process of
drafting and ratifying a constitution.
The Union's expansion, bringing in ten new member
countries, also brings into the Union people who are
often much poorer and culturally vastly different
from the majority of the citizens in the older member
states. The vast majority of these new EU citizens,
many of whom endured decades of subjugation to Communist
regimes, hold thoughts and values indelibly marked
by experiences unfamiliar to long-time EU citizens.
As a result, economic and cultural differences within
the Union have, at a stroke, become much greater and
more intense. The constitutional process to define
the Union in a more ambitious way fuels this intensity
to an even greater degree.
Faced with growing diversity and
the rigours of establishing a more demanding
kind of unity, what forces can hold the expanded,
redefined European Union together? What moral concepts,
which traditions, what goals are capable of bringing
together the Union’s diverse inhabitants in
a democratic structure, and so underpin and anchor
the European constitution?
To examine these questions Romano Prodi, the President
of the European Commission, appointed academics and
politicians from a number of Union member countries
to reflect on the intellectual and cultural dimension
of an EU in the process of enlargement - in particular
to consider the relevance of this dimension to the
cohesion of the expanded and redefined Union.
2. Hitherto the
Union has been enormously successful. It established
durable bonds which made a European civil war virtually
impossible. The Union established a zone of peace
founded on freedom, the rule of law, and social
justice. Within its member states the Union
speeded the task of overcoming the economic consequences
of the Second World War, promoting reconstruction
and, later, unprecedented affluence across Europe.
Economic integration and the gradual abolition of
national economies led the way to this peaceful order.
After the First World War, the French army occupied
the Ruhr in order to prevent a revival of German heavy
industry. After the Second World War, the French and
the Germans decided to integrate their coal and steel
industries. In doing so they laid the foundation stone
for a lasting European peace.
3. A strong political will in the
six founding states was needed both to make this development
possible and to sustain it. Such a will was possible
because of several factors that encouraged integration:
the profound and widespread shock of the Second
World War; the mounting threat posed by the Soviet
Union, and the economic dynamism released
by the founding of the Union’s precursor, the
European Economic Community (EEC), and further enhanced
by the integration of national economies.
4. As memories of the Second World
War faded and the risk of conflict between the Atlantic
Alliance and the Soviet Union receded, the transformation
of the EEC into the European Community, and finally
into the European Union, pushed the Union's economic
goals ever more to the fore. Economic growth, improvement
in living standards, extending and enhancing systems
of social protection, and rounding off the common
market assumed a priority.
But given the growing number of member states, economic
and social differences expanded – as did the
expectations of EU citizens. Over time, it became
increasingly evident that economic integration –
no matter how important it and its political consequences
may be – is incapable of substituting for the
political forces that originally propelled European
integration and cohesion.
This is why the aims formulated a few years ago by
the Lisbon Council – to make Europe the most
competitive economic region in the world by 2010,
to establish the labour participation rate of 70%,
and to bring about lasting growth, affluence, and
social justice – have effectively disappeared
from public consciousness. Not only have these goals
been overtaken by events; they also do nothing to
bring Europeans any closer together. They do not and
cannot establish the internal cohesion that is necessary
for the European Union; nor, indeed, can economic
forces alone provide cohesion for any political identity.
To function as a viable and vital polity, the European
Union needs a firmer foundation.
It is no coincidence that economic integration is
not enough to drive European political reform. Economic
integration simply does not, of itself, lead to political
integration because markets cannot produce
a politically resilient solidarity. Solidarity
– a genuine sense of civic community –
is vital because the competition that dominates the
marketplace gives rise to powerful centrifugal forces.
Markets may create the economic basis of a polity
and are thereby an indispensable condition of its
political constitution. But they cannot on their own
produce political integration and provide a constitutive
infrastructure for the Union. The original expectation,
that the political unity of the EU would be a consequence
of the European common market has proven to be illusory.
Indeed, the current debate over the reform of the
Union’s Growth and Stability Pact shows once
again that economic integration, symbolised by the
launching of the euro, can only continue as a basis
of Europe’s peaceful order if it is followed
by a deeper political integration within the Union.
A currency union means a common economic policy. But
when the forces of cohesion based on shared economic
successes wane or are overshadowed by internal competition,
a common economic policy requires political integration,
i.e. a level of internal cohesion that remains effective
even when economic interests diverge.
So Europe’s political union demands political
cohesion, a politically grounded community
bound by the ties of solidarity. Both the future of
the Union and the dimensions of its political integration
will be decided by whether these political forces
of cohesion exist and whether they prove to be adequate
in times of crisis.
5. Recognising this, the countries
of the European Union deliberately set out on the
path of political integration. The Union’s constitutional
process expresses this decision. But how much political
integration is necessary and how politically potent
should the Union become? To what end
does the Union need the political ability
to act?
5.1 First, because an economic order
never evolves in a value-free environment. It needs
a legal framework and protection, the development
of necessary institutions and the establishment and
enforcement by the state of the standards and duties
forged and agreed among the people. An effective and
just economic order must also be embedded in the morals,
customs, and expectations of human beings, as well
as in their social institutions. So the manner in
which the larger European economic area – the
common market – is in harmony with the values
of European citizens, as varied as these may be, is
no mere academic problem; it is a fundamental and
political one. The constant need to make Europe’s
political expression reflect the values of Europe’s
citizens is as significant as the functioning of the
common market itself.
5.2 Second, this task, the full
extent of which became evident with the completion
of the common market, requires political institutions
with legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.
Only by developing such institutions (for example,
a structure of economic governance that can manage
the currency union) and assuring their political legitimacy,
can a viable and vital political entity be created.
The Union’s constitutional process and the subsequent
adoption of the European constitutional treaty will,
it is expected, provide a lasting legitimacy for the
institutional framework of a politically constituted
Europe. The constitutional treaty is intended to define
the Union’s political unity.
5.3 Third, the Union also needs
the political ability to act because it confronts
a myriad of new tasks:
- overcoming the consequences of Europe’s aging
population;
- managing, both politically and legally, the desire
of people from around the globe to immigrate into
the Union;
- dealing with the increasing inequality that is the
direct result of increased immigration as well as
the Union’s expansion;
- preserving peace in a globalised world.
6. So where are the forces of cohesion
for the new political Union to be found if the common
interests produced by economic integration are no
longer sufficient? We believe that the older forces
that animated European unification are no longer sufficiently
powerful to provide genuine political cohesion, and
that, therefore, new sources of energy must
be looked for and found in Europe’s common culture.
This does not, of course, mean that the powers which
have served until now will play no role in the future.
But what has changed today is the relative
significance of the existing forces of cohesion,
and their relative contribution to the future unity
of Europe. As the old forces of integration –
desire for peace, external threats, and economic growth
– are losing their effectiveness, the role of
Europe’s common culture – the spiritual
factor of European integration – will inevitably
grow in importance as a source of unity and cohesion.
At the same time the meaning of European culture
needs to be better understood and made politically
effective. A mere list of common European values is
not enough to serve as the basis of European unity,
even if the charter of basic rights included in the
Union’s constitutional treaty points in this
direction. This is so because every attempt to codify
"European values" is inevitably confronted
by a variety of diverging national, regional, ethnic,
sectarian, and social understandings. This diversity
of interpretation cannot be eliminated by a constitutional
treaty, even if backed up by legislation and judicial
interpretation.
Still, despite such difficulties of definition, there
can be no doubt that there exists a common European
cultural space: a variety of traditions, ideals, and
aspirations, often intertwined and at the same time
in tension with one another. These traditions, ideals,
and aspirations bring us together in a shared context
and make us "Europeans": citizens and peoples
capable of a political unity and a constitution that
we all recognise and experience as "European".
The common European cultural space cannot be firmly
defined and delimited; its borders are necessarily
open, not because of our ignorance, but in principle
— because European culture, indeed Europe itself,
is not a “fact”. It is a task
and a process.
What is European culture? What is Europe? These are
questions that must be constantly posed anew. So long
as Europe is of the present, and not simply the past,
they can never be conclusively answered. Europe’s
identity is something that must be negotiated by its
peoples and institutions. Europeans can and must adapt
themselves and their institutions, so that European
values, traditions, and conceptions of life can live
on and be effective. At the same time, the Union and
its citizens must make their values endure as a basis
of a common identity through ever-changing conditions.
Europe and its cultural identity thus depend on a
constant confrontation with the new, the different,
the foreign. Hence the question of European identity
will be answered in part by its immigration laws,
and in part by the negotiated accession terms of new
members. Neither of these – either the immigration
laws or the terms of accession – can be determined
a priori on the basis of fixed, static definitions,
such as a catalogue of "European values".
7. If Europe is not a fact, but
a task, neither can there be any fixed, once and for
all defined European boundaries, be they internal
or external. Europe’s boundaries too must always
be renegotiated. It is not geographical or national
borders, then, that define the European cultural space
– it is rather the latter which defines the
European geographical space, a space that is in principle
open.
This also means that the common European
cultural space cannot be defined in
opposition to national cultures. Polish farmers
and British workers should not see "European
culture" as something foreign or even threatening.
For the same reason European culture cannot
be defined in opposition to a particular religion
(such as Islam). What constitutes the content of "European
culture" is not a philosophical question that
can be answered a priori; nor is it a merely historical
question. It is a question that calls for political
decisions which attempt to demonstrate the significance
of tradition in the face of future tasks that Europe’s
Union must address.
8. European culture, that open space
which must be forever redefined, does not, of itself,
establish European unity. That unity also requires
a political dimension and the decisions that it engenders.
But the common European culture is what gives politics
the opportunity to make Europe into a unified political
entity.
The unity of Europe is not, however,
only a political task. Politics can
create only the basic conditions for European unification.
Europe itself is far more than a political construct.
It is a complex – a “culture” -
of institutions, ideas and expectations, habits and
feelings, moods, memories and prospects that form
a “glue” binding Europeans together –
and all these are a foundation on which a political
construction must rest. This complex – we can
speak of it as European civil society
– is at the heart of political identity. It
defines the conditions of successful European politics,
and also the limits of state and political intervention.
In order to foster the cohesion necessary for political
unity, European politics must thus support the emergence
and development of a civil society in Europe. It is
through these institutions of civil society that our
common European culture can become a reality. But
this also means that politics and state institutions
must be ready to recognize their limits.
This self-limitation implies that the political culture
of Europe must be compatible with the sense of community
rooted in a common European culture. To lay claim
to a common European culture and history as the basis
of political identity, European political institutions
must live up to the expectations engendered by the
European cultural tradition. In particular, the exercise
of political power must be based on a persuasive and
transparent political leadership, rather than express
itself as bureaucratic action of questionable legitimacy.
Decentralisation of public discussion and the processes
of decision-making is especially important. Indeed,
only decentralisation can do justice to the cultural
variety and the wealth of forms of social organisation
that make up the European civil society.
9. If the countries of Europe are
to grow together into a viable political union, the
people of Europe must be prepared for a European
solidarity. This solidarity must be stronger
than the universal solidarity which binds (or should
bind) all human beings together and underlies the
idea of humanitarian aid.
European solidarity – the readiness to open
one’s wallet and to commit one’s life
to others because they, too, are Europeans –
is not something that can be imposed from above. It
must be more than institutional solidarity.
It must be felt by Europeans as individuals. When
individual solidarity is not there,
institutionally-based solidarity is not enough to
bring a polity into being.
The intellectual, economic, and political tendencies
of recent decades - not least the advance of individualism
- have led to an erosion of many forms of social solidarity.
The crisis of the welfare state may be understood
as a consequence of this development. This erosion
may also be felt in the context of the recent European
enlargement: it is reflected in the diminished willingness
– in comparison with earlier expansions –
among the citizens of older member countries to lend
a hand, economically and politically, to the newcomers.
Strengthening of pan-European solidarity is one of
the most important long-term tasks of European politics.
In trying to accomplish this task, we should not labour
under the illusion that the need for solidarity can
be satisfied by institutional measures alone. Rather,
all institutional measures must be sustained by the
readiness of the population to manifest their own
spirit of solidarity. It is thus important to give
solidarity an active and prospective, rather than
passive and retrospective, dimension: we must define
it in terms of the new common tasks that Europe must
address – rather than with respect to past achievements
in sharing our wealth with the existing members of
the Union.
10. A particular challenge for
European solidarity arises from the expansion of the
Union to countries previously forming part of the
Soviet empire. How we deal with this challenge will
be decisive for the future of Europe.
How will this expansion alter the conditions of European
solidarity? What do the new members bring to the common
table? Will they, as many fear, be mainly spoilers,
and will they - traumatised by totalitarianism and
lacking a strong Enlightenment tradition – slow
down, or even bring to a halt, the process of the
Union's democratisation? Will they, because of their
historically and strategically determined closeness
to the United States, frustrate Europe’s aspirations
to a common foreign policy? Or will the new members
not only expose the Union to new dangers, but also
open up new opportunities?
The year 1989 ushered Europe into a new age. It did
not just make possible the enlargement of Europe to
the former Communist East. It also enriched Europe.
That is why the new members, despite their economic
weakness, should be taken in as equal partners in
the Union. They should be able to shape the new union
together with the old members. But we must look also
for other links, for the European face of their traditions
and experiences.
That the European Union was given, in 1989, a historic
opportunity of rebirth was in large part due to the
revolutionary uprisings of people in the Communist-ruled
Eastern Europe. The East European revolutions were
proof of the strength of the solidarity of
a civil society. They are the best evidence
that true political realism must take the existence
of these bonds into account – and not only the
interests writ in stone and mortar of political institutions.
11. In the search for the forces
capable of establishing cohesion and identity in the
European Union, the question of the public
role of European religions is particularly
important.
Over the last few centuries, European democratic
societies, learning from tragic experience, have attempted
to remove religion from the political sphere. Religion
was considered, with good reason, to be divisive,
not conciliatory. That may still be the case today.
But Europe’s religions also have a potential
to bring people in Europe together, instead of separating
them.
We believe that the presence of religion in the public
sphere cannot be reduced to the public role of the
churches or to the societal relevance of explicitly
religious views. Religions have long been an inseparable
component of the various cultures of Europe. They
are active "under the surface" of the political
and state institutions; they also have an effect on
society and individuals. The result is a new wealth
of forms of religion entwined with cultural meanings.
Even in Europe, where modernisation and secularisation
appear to go hand in hand, public life without religion
is inconceivable. The community-fostering power of
Europe’s religious faiths should be supported
and deployed on behalf of the cohesion of the new
Europe. The risks involved, however, should not be
overlooked. These include a possible invasion of the
public sphere by religious institutions, as well as
the threat that religion may be used to justify ethnic
conflicts. It must be remembered that many apparent
religious conflicts have political or social causes,
and that they may be solved by social measures before
they become religiously charged.
The questions concerning the public role of religion
in Europe resurfaced recently because of the Balkan
wars, the Muslim immigration into Europe, and (so
far less dramatically) the prospect of Turkey’s
becoming an EU member. The question of the political
relevance of Islam comes to the forefront
in this connection.
It is, to be sure, hard to deny that the increasing
presence of the various forms of Islam in Europe's
public space poses both new opportunities and new
dangers for European integration. It potentially calls
into question the prevailing current ideas about Europe’s
public space. Among European Moslems as well, there
is a tendency to detach their religion from the specific
cultural and social context of their homelands, and
this may have potentially dangerous consequences.
But the only feasible path toward a solution of the
problems posed by Islam in Europe consists in understanding
the consequences of transplanting Islam into a European
context, not in a frontal confrontation between the
abstractions of "Christian Europe" and "Islam".
12. What is the impact of the intellectual
and cultural meaning of Europe on Europe's
role in the world? To the extent that Europe
acknowledges the values inherent in the rules that
constitute the European identity, those very same
values will make it impossible for Europeans not to
acknowledge the duty of solidarity toward non-Europeans.
This globally defined solidarity imposes on Europe
an obligation to contribute, in accordance with its
ability, to the securing of world peace and the fight
against poverty. But despite this global calling,
there can be no justification for attempting to impose,
perhaps with the help of the institutions of a common
European foreign and defence policy, any specific
catalogue of values on other peoples.
The fundamental dilemma of European foreign policy
is the tension between the logic of peace and the
logic of cohesion. Europe sees itself as both a
zone of peace and a community of
values. This dilemma cannot be solved a priori.
There is no essence of Europe, no fixed list of European
values. There is no "finality" to the process
of European integration.
Europe is a project of the future. With every decision,
not only its zone of peace, its institutions, its
political, economic and social order, but also its
very identity and self-determination are opened for
questioning and debate. In principle this has been
the case throughout Europe’s history. Europe’s
capacity for constant change and renewal was and remains
the most important source of its success and its unique
character. This source must always be recognised anew
and given an institutional form: through European
politics, through civil society, and through the force
of European culture. In the end, it all comes to this:
we must sustain and use our European heritage, and
not allow it to perish.
October 2004
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